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Abstract
In a social choice model with an inﬁnite number of agents, there
may occur “equal size” coalitions that a preference aggregation rule
should treat in the same manner. We introduce an axiom of equal
treatment with respect to a measure of coalition size and explore its
interaction with common axioms of social choice. We show that, pro-
vided the measure space is suﬃciently rich in coalitions of the same
measure, the new axiom is the natural extension of the concept of
anonymity, and in particular plays a similar role in the characteriza-
tion of preference aggregation rules. JEL D71, C69
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It has long been known that social choice models with an inﬁnite number of
agents diﬀer in signiﬁcant ways from models with ﬁnitely many agents. In
particular, large societies admit preference aggregation rules satisfying the
standard Arrovian axioms of eﬃciency, independence, non-dictatorship and
transitivity (see, for instance, Fishburn [11], Kirman and Sondermann [14]
or Hansson [12]). These Arrovian rules involve, in the words of Kirman
and Sondermann [14], “invisible dictators:” collections of decisive coalitions
that recede into inﬁnity so that no particular individual has to be a member
of every decisive coalition. Kirman and Sondermann showed that if there is a
ﬁnite, countably additive measure on the agent space then for any Arrovian
rule there are arbitrarily small decisive coalitions. However, Schmitz [19]
showed that when the measure on the agent space is allowed to be inﬁnite
then there are Arrovian rules for which the decisive coalitions have mea-
sure ∞. Armstrong [2] extended the earlier results to societies where the
set of admissible coalitions is restricted to be an algebra, with the implied
measurability restriction on the social choice rules.
One intuitively appealing way to reestablish Arrow’s impossibility re-
sult in the context of large societies is to show that Arrovian rules violate
some form of equal treatment. Surprisingly, it seems that no attempt has
been made to tie the measure of coalition size with the idea of equal treat-
ment. Instead, Mihara [16] recently extended the usual notion of anonymity
from a ﬁnite-agent to the inﬁnite-agent set-up. The usual anonymity axiom
states that a social choice rule should be insensitive to permutations of the
agent space. Mihara [16] found that, subject to a simple richness condi-
tion on the algebra of admissible coalitions, any measurable Arrovian rule
must treat diﬀerently coalitions of the same cardinality and thus violates
anonymity. However, whenever the set of agents is endowed with a measure-
space structure, there is no reason why a cardinality-based equal-treatment
notion should be the relevant one. In fact, in certain applications it may be
rather hard to justify, since it would require equal treatment of intuitively
very diﬀerent coalitions such as those including, respectively, every second
and every thousandth agent. A number of restrictions on agent permuta-
tions allowed in the deﬁnition of anonymity have therefore been proposed.
One of these, which seems to avoid some of the counterintuitive implications
mentioned above, has been proposed by Lauwers [15]. This is “bounded
anonymity,” which can be viewed as requiring admissible permutations to
1be measure-preserving for a particular (“frequency”) measure on the set of
agents (though Lauwers never explicitly introduces a measure space for the
case when there are countably many agents). Our framework allows us to
deﬁne anonymity in a general way that encompasses the previous deﬁnitions.
We study the consequences of explicitly incorporating the notion of the
coalition measure size into a social choice model and requiring equal-treat-
ment of coalitions of equal measure. We oﬀer three sets of results. First,
we show that, subject to a richness condition on the equal-measure coalition
classes, equal-treatment results in the restoration of Arrow’s impossibility.
Second, we relax the requirement of transitivity by dropping the require-
ment of transitivity of social indiﬀerence, and show that with this adjustment
our equal treatment axiom is consistent with Pareto and independence of
irrelevant alternatives. Subject to another richness condition on the equal-
measure coalition classes, the only preference aggregation rules satisfying
Pareto, equal-treatment, neutrality and quasi-transitivity are the consensual
rules: rules that give veto power to every positive measure coalition. Third,
we show that Pareto, equal-treatment, neutrality and monotonicity charac-
terize a class of preference aggregation rules which we call measuring rules.
These rules are the large society equivalent to the counting rules described
by Austen-Smith and Banks [6].
Recently, Banks, Duggan and Le Breton [7] have extended the theory
of the core, the uncovered set, and the related undominated set to a model
with a general set of alternatives and a measure space of voters, showing,
inter alia, the general emptiness of the core and the general non-emptiness of
the uncovered and the undominated set. The anonymity property that they
deﬁne in the context of simple games corresponds to our equal treatment
notion. The focus of their work, however, is quite diﬀerent.
It should be noted that our approach to modelling large societies is en-
tirely consistent with the now standard approach to modelling large compet-
itive economies in general equilibrium theory (see Hildenbrand [13]). Given
the objectives of this study, we do not require many of the usual assumptions
in that literature. However, care is taken to ensure that all of our results go
through in that setting.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a
model of measurable social choice following Armstrong [2]. In section 3 we
introduce the notion of coalition size. In section 4 we deﬁne the property of
anonymity with respect to a measure and explore the consequences of im-
posing it in the place of the standard cardinality-based anonymity property.
2In Section 5 we discuss possible extensions.
2 Measurable Social Choice
2.1 Agents and Coalitions
Let N be the (non-empty) set of individuals (voters); it can be either a
ﬁnite or a (countably or uncountably) inﬁnite set. A coalition is any subset
L ⊂ N. A coalition algebra is any class of coalitions L ⊂ 2N that contains N
itself and is closed under the formation of complements and ﬁnite unions (or,
equivalently, ﬁnite intersections). The pair (N,L) is a coalition measurable
space.
A coalition algebra is a collection of admissible coalitions that satisﬁes
some minimum requirements: the union of two admissible coalitions should
itself be admissible, and the complement of an admissible coalition should
also be admissible. The admissibility restriction may arise from the nature
of the economic model at hand; alternatively it could be viewed as coming
from observability or computability constraints facing the social planner as
in [17]. The fact that the set of admissible coalitions is required to be an
algebra reﬂects our interest in being able to make statements like: “the set
of people not in coalition A” or “the set of those either in A or in B.”
The results that follow do not require that the set of coalitions form a σ-
algebra; many interesting examples with a countably inﬁnite set of voters
would fail that requirement. On the other hand, there are many models,
such as the standard treatment of competitive economy with a continuum
of agents (following Aumann [5]) where the set of admissible coalitions is a
σ-algebra. Naturally, our results apply in such settings as well.
We next consider coalition measurable spaces that are ﬁne enough to
admit all coalitions of interest in some examples of large societies.
2.2 Some Coalition Measurable Spaces
The usual social choice framework considers a ﬁnite set N of individuals. In
this case, any coalition is considered admissible, so L = 2N.
For any N inﬁnite, consider the algebra LcN which is composed of all
ﬁnite (including the empty set) and coﬁnite (complements of ﬁnite) subsets
of N. This is the coarsest algebra that admits all the singleton coalitions, so
3in a sense it is the coarsest algebra of interest. We call (N,LcN) the coﬁnite
coalition measurable space.
In the context of countable societies, some ﬁner algebras may be of
interest, as suggested by the following example proposed by Mihara [16].
Consider a society composed of ﬁnitely many people, where there is un-
certainty expressed as a countable number of states of the world. Index
the individuals by j = 1,...,n and the states by s = 1,2,...; we can
let the preferences of person j in state s be represented by an individ-
ual i = n(s − 1) + j. It seems natural to consider as admissible coali-
tions the sets {i ∈ N : i = n(s − 1) + j,s = 1,2,...} (n-period sets) for
j = 1,...,n, representing the person j in all states of the world, and the sets
{i ∈ N : (s − 1)n < i ≤ sn} for s = 1,2,..., representing all the individuals
in a particular state. Note that an algebra containing both types of sets will
include also all the coalitions consisting of a single individual, and hence all
ﬁnite and coﬁnite coalitions. We denote this algebra as Lp,n, and we call
(N,Lp,n) the n-period coalition measurable space.
We may also wish to consider a coalition algebra that recognizes all ad-
missible coalitions for arbitrary n. The coarsest such algebra admits all ﬁnite
unions of n−period sets (periodic sets), as well as all unions and diﬀerences
of a periodic and a ﬁnite set. We denote this algebra by Lp, and refer to
(N,Lp) as the periodic coalition measurable space.
Other example where the n−period coalition space may be reasonable
is the following. Consider a society composed of ﬁnitely many dynasties,
which we index by j = 1,...,n; at each period s = 1,2,... each dynasty
is represented by one individual. We can name an individual belonging to
dynasty j and living in period s by i = n(s − 1) + j. It seems natural to
consider as admissible coalitions the sets including all members of a dynasty
as well as the sets including all individuals living at a given period. Other
coalition algebras on the same set of agents may be of interest as well. Of
course, the ﬁnest such algebra is the power set 2N of N. A coalition here is
any collection of individuals.
As noted by Banks, Duggan, and Le Breton [7], uncountable societies,
in the form of a continuous distribution of voters, appear in many examples
in the political science literature, including the party competition model of
Downs [9]. This is also the standard setting of the Aumann’s [5] continuum
of agents model of perfect competition. In this case it may be natural to
consider the agent space to be N = [0,1] with the Borel σ-algebra of coalitions
over it. A coalition here is a (Borel-measurable) collection of agents.
42.3 Measurable Societies and Preference Aggregation
In this section we set up the choice space of the problem and the space of
agents’ characteristics. We depart from the literature stemming from Kir-
man and Sondermann [14] by requiring the latter to be measurable. This is
necessary given our choice of the equal-treatment notion that follows. Our
treatment of the large society in this section follows Hildenbrand’s [13] refor-
mulation of Aumann’s [5] model (see also Ellickson [10]). In this, our set-up
is similar to Banks, Duggan and Le Breton [7]. At the same time, for the
problem at hand we do not need all the assumptions on the structure of
both the agents’ characteristics’ space and the space of alternatives that are
imposed in the general equilibrium literature.
Let X be a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) set of alternatives, which has at least three
elements. Each individual has a preference relation (a reﬂexive, complete,
and transitive binary relation, i.e. a weak order) on X. When it is convenient,
we can view any binary relation (and in particular a preference relation) as
a subset of the product space X × X. We will usually denote a preference
relation by the letter R; P will denote the corresponding strict preference
(the asymmetric part of R), and I the indiﬀerence relation (the symmetric
part of R). Denote by R the set of all weak orders on X.
Whenever X is a ﬁnite set, any preference relations are considered ad-
missible. However, when X is inﬁnite some restrictions must be imposed,
like the consideration of only continuous preferences in general equilibrium
models. Actually, we impose a constraint not on individual preferences, but
on the preference proﬁles. In order to do this, we consider an algebra E on
the space of preferences, so that the admissible preferences form a measur-
able space (R,E). Then, the constraint on preference proﬁles will be that
they be a measurable mapping from the measurable space of agents to the
measurable space of preferences.
We call the measurable space (R,E) the type space of our economy. Un-
like, for instance, Hildenbrand [13], we need not completely specify the choice
of a topology and derive from it the algebra on R. However, since we are
going to be interested in pairwise comparisons of alternatives we shall assume
throughout the paper that E is suﬃciently rich:
Assumption (UD) For any x,y ∈ X the set {R ∈ R : xRy} belongs to E.
We have termed this assumption (UD) because it stands for Universal
Domain. Whenever X and N are ﬁnite, a basic assumption of Arrow’s The-
5orem is the Universal Domain of preferences, i.e. all preference rankings are
considered admissible. Our assumption (UD) is equivalent to the requirement
that all rankings among any ﬁnite set of alternatives are admissible, and is
precisely what is needed in order to ensure that the admissible preference
proﬁles are rich enough so that the natural extensions of Arrow’s Theorem
continue to be valid.
In practice, the choice of E will derive from the economic and/or mathe-
matical structure of the particular model at hand. In much of existing social
choice literature, where measurability issues do not explicitly arise, it is im-
plicit that E = 2R. On the other hand, the choice of the Borel σ-algebra
derived from the topology of closed convergence, as in Hildenbrand [13], also
satisﬁes assumption (UD) (see Banks, Duggan, and Le Breton [7]).
As we mentioned above, a preference proﬁle is a measurable mapping
from the agent space to the type space
ρ : N → R
that assigns a preference relation ρ(i) = Ri to each agent i (with Pi and Ii,
respectively, its asymmetric and symmetric parts).
The measurability restriction in the deﬁnition of a preference proﬁle
means that for any E ∈ E, the coalition {i : Ri ∈ E} of all individuals
whose preferences lie in E belongs to L.
Denote by RN
L,E the set of all preference proﬁles, and by B the set of all
reﬂexive and complete (not necessarily transitive) binary relations on X.




A preference aggregation rule assigns to every preference proﬁle ρ a re-
ﬂexive and complete binary relation, the social preference R = f(ρ). We
denote by P and I, respectively, the asymmetric and the symmetric parts of
the social preference R.
A coalition L ∈ L is decisive under an aggregation rule f if
[∀i ∈ L, xPiy ] ⇒ xPy
for all pairs (x,y) ∈ X × X, and for all preference proﬁles.
6Given a non-empty set of decisive coalitions Df associated to a certain f,
we can deﬁne the preference aggregation rule fD as
xPy ⇐⇒ [∃L ∈ Df : ∀i ∈ L, xPiy]
for all pairs (x,y) ∈ X × X, and for all preference proﬁles. We say that f is
a simple rule if f = fD.
The following are some desirable criteria an aggregation rule might satisfy:
Deﬁnition 2 A preference aggregation rule f is
(P1) weakly Paretian if, for every ρ ∈ RN
L and for any x,y ∈ X,
[{i ∈ N : xPiy} = N ] ⇒ xPy.
(P2) independent of irrelevant alternatives if for every ρ,ρ0 ∈ RN
L and for
any x,y ∈ X,
[ρ|{x,y} = ρ
0|{x,y} ] ⇒ [f(ρ)|{x,y} = f(ρ
0)|{x,y} ],
where ρ|S represents the restriction of ρ to the set S.
(P3) nondictatorial if there does not exist i ∈ N such that xPiy implies xPy
for every ρ ∈ RN
L and for any x,y ∈ X.
(P4) transitive if for every ρ ∈ RN
L and for all x,y,z ∈ X,
xRy & yRz ⇒ xRz.
Arrow’s [4] impossibility theorem shows that, if N and X are ﬁnite and
assumption (UD) is satisﬁed, there is no preference aggregation function sat-
isfying properties (P1) to (P4). Fishburn [11], Kirman and Sondermann [14]
and others have shown that, in fact, such functions are possible once an
inﬁnite set of voters is considered. Armstrong [2] extended this result to
coalition measurable spaces. Our ﬁrst result is a straightforward corollary of
Proposition 3.2 in Armstrong [2].
Whenever N is inﬁnite, for any measurable space (N,L) such that L ⊃
LcN, deﬁne a preference aggregation rule σc by
xPy ⇐⇒ [{i ∈ N : xPiy} is a coﬁnite set]
for all directed pairs x,y ∈ X. That is, σc is the simple rule with the coﬁnite
sets as decisive coalitions. We say that a rule f is an extension of σc if
Df ⊃ {L ∈ 2N : L is coﬁnite}.
7Proposition 1 Let N be an inﬁnite set, and let assumption (UD) hold.
For any measurable space (N,L) such that L ⊃ LcN, there exists at least
one preference aggregation rule satisfying (P1) to (P4); any such rule is an
extension of σc.
Proof: It follows immediately from Armstrong’s [2] proposition 3.2 (as
amended in [3]) that for every free ultraﬁlter U of measurable coalitions there
exists an aggregation rule satisfying (P1)-(P4) such that all coalitions in U
are decisive, and vice-versa, for every measurable social choice rule satisfying
(P1)-(P4) the set of decisive coalitions is a free ultraﬁlter.
It is easy to see that in every measurable space (N,L) such that L ⊃ LcN,
the set of coﬁnite coalitions is a free ﬁlter. By an application of Zorn’s
lemma ([1], p. 32), there exists a free ultraﬁlter of measurable coalitions that
contains the set of coﬁnite coalitions.
Now suppose there exists a measurable social choice rule f satisfying
(P1)-(P4), and a coﬁnite coalition Lc ∈ L that is not decisive under f. Then
its complement Lc
c ∈ U is a ﬁnite decisive coalition under f. But (P3) implies
that no individual is in every decisive coalition. That is, for every i ∈ Lc
c







there exists a ﬁnite set of elements of U with an empty intersection, which
contradicts the deﬁnition of a ﬁlter. 2
In general, explicitly constructing Arrovian rules may be rather diﬃcult
(see [18]). For an easy example, consider a society consisting of two inﬁnitely-
lived dynasties. As discussed above a natural algebra of admissible coalitions
for such a society could be Lp,2. The one-dynasty coalitions in this setting are
represented by the sets of odd and even numbers, respectively. A preference
aggregation rule satisfying all the four properties can be deﬁned as follows:
xPy ⇐⇒ [{j ∈ N : xP2jy} is a coﬁnite set]
for all directed pairs x,y ∈ X. In words, this rule says that an alternative is
preferred to another if and only if all but ﬁnitely many members of the second
coalition agree. It is obvious that all coﬁnite coalitions are decisive (notice,
however, that σc itself is not Arrovian, since it would violate transitivity).
A striking feature of the above example is that the social choice rule
discriminates among dynasties: the “evens” eventually rule. In fact, as we
show below, this has to be generally the case for rules satisfying (P1)-(P4).
This seems to violate some notion of “equal treatment” of what should be




In a ﬁnite world, a coalition’s size is easy to deﬁne as its cardinality. This is
the idea behind the standard anonymity axiom in social choice, which says
that a social choice rule should be invariant under the agents’ permutations.
Mihara [16] has shown that, subject to a richness condition on the algebra of
admissible coalitions, invariance under permutations of agents is inconsistent
with (P1) - (P4). Unfortunately, in an inﬁnite society such axiom may be
hard to justify. Consider for instance the dynastic society example. It is
straightforward to show that, if the number of dynasties n is larger than 2,
there exists a permutation of the agent space that transforms a single dynasty
into its union with another dynasty. It seems rather hard to insist on equal
treatment of such clearly diﬀerent coalitions.
We could, of course, recall that our dynastic society is endowed with an
additional L−measurability structure. A natural question to ask is, there-
fore, if it alone can help resolve this problem. Unfortunately, referring to the
example above, it is possible to construct periodically measurable permuta-
tions that change the period of a coalition. To sum up, while cardinality-
based anonymity notions are undoubtedly of interest, in order to discuss
coalition size in important applications they may be inadequate. We there-
fore proceed to deﬁne explicitly coalition size as its measure, and to study
the consequences of requiring equal treatment of equal measure (rather than
equal cardinality) coalitions.
Even if the set of individuals N is ﬁnite, the introduction of a measure
allows the consideration of situations in which individuals (or institutions)
may have diﬀerent weights.
Deﬁnition 3 Given a coalition measurable space (N,L), a set function µ
on the algebra L is a coalition measure if:
(i) µ(L) ∈ [0,1] for L ∈ L;
(ii) µ(∅) = 0 and µ(N) = 1;











Note that we only require the probability measure µ to be ﬁnitely additive.
The triple (N,L,µ) is a coalition measure space. An extension of a mea-
sure space (N,L,µ) is any measure space (N,L0,µ0) such that L0 ⊃ L and
µ0(L) = µ(L) for every L ∈ L.
3.2 Some Coalition Measure Spaces
We present here some coalition measure spaces of interest. Consider ﬁrst the
coﬁnite measurable space, and deﬁne the measure µc by
µc (L) =

0 if L is ﬁnite
1 if L is coﬁnite
(note that this is the only coalition measure that assigns equal weight to all
singleton coalitions in the coﬁnite measurable space). We refer to (N,LcN,µc)
as the coﬁnite coalition measure space.
For another example, consider the n-period coalition measurable space
(N,Lp,n). Treating all n−period coalitions as having equal size implies the
following coalition measure on Lp,n :




#[m ∈ L : 1 < m ≤ k].
This measure assigns 0 to every ﬁnite set, 1
n to every n-period set, and 1 to
every coﬁnite set. We refer to (N,Lp,n,µp,n) as the n-period measure space.
Consider the periodic coalition measurable space (N,Lp). Extending µp,n





#[m ∈ L : 1 < m ≤ k].
Like µp,n, the measure µp is not countably additive. Consider the follow-
ing example. Let L1 be the periodic set containing all individuals named with
odd natural numbers. For each n ≥ 2, deﬁne Ln = L1 \{k ∈ N : 1 ≤ k ≤ n}.
10Then ∀n, Ln+1 ⊂ Ln. Now Ln ↓ ∅, since, given any k ∈ N, n > k ⇒ k 6∈ Ln.
But µp(Ln) → 1/2, since for all n, µp(An) = 1/2. The reason why µp is not
countably additive is that µp is very diﬀerent from the regular probability
measures on complete metric spaces. All such probability measures are tight,
that is, most of their mass is concentrated on a compact set. On the other
hand, as our previous example illustrates, the value of µp is independent of
what happens in any ﬁnite set, that is, µp concentrates most of its mass “at
inﬁnity.”
We refer to (N,Lp,µp) as the periodic coalition measure space. Obviously,
the periodic measure space is an extension of every n-period measure space.
Billingsley ([8], p. 577) presents an example showing that (N,Lp,µp) cannot
be uniquely extended to include all sets such that µp is well-deﬁned.
Going back to the dynastic example, the periodic measures are not the
only ones of interest. We may wish to construct a measure that “discounts”
the welfare of future generations according to a factor β ∈ (0,1); in this case,
we can construct a probability measure over Lp,n that assigns measure 1/n
to every n-period set, and measure (1−β)βs−1/n to every individual j such
that n(s − 1) < j ≤ ns. We refer to this as the (n,β)-discounting measure
space. In the dynastic example may think of the n-period measure space as
appropriate from a normative perspective if discounting of future generations
is disallowed.
The discounting measure space admits atoms – in fact, it is purely atomic.
Other reasons to allow atoms include making explicit the idea that some in-
dividuals (we could call them “politicians”) may have a non-negligible weight
even in a large society, whereas others may be negligible on their own. Alter-
natively, atoms may arise if we want to accommodate political organizations
as “indivisible” coalitions, while also allowing for the presence of unorganized
agents.
Finally, in the example with a continuous distribution of voters over the
interval [0,1], a natural choice is the Lebesgue measure.
4 Equal-Treatment of Equal-Size Coalitions
4.1 Arrow Theorem Revisited
We now explore the consequences of adopting the concept of anonymity as
an equal-treatment notion. The intuitive notion of anonymity is that the
11aggregation rule should not depend on the identities of the agents. In a ﬁnite
setting, this requirement has been translated as the property that a permu-
tation σ of the set of agents should not change the aggregation rule, that is,
f(ρ◦σ) = f(ρ). Now, when N is inﬁnite this deﬁnition must be generalized,
and several (diﬀerent) attempts have been made in the literature. Our setting
allows a precise generalization, since we take as a departing point a coalition
measure space. The problem in previous generalizations is that the ﬁnite
case has an implicit measure (which assigns to each set its cardinality), and
with an inﬁnite N without a measure it is diﬃcult to generalize the notion of
permutations. To motivate our deﬁnition as the suitable generalization, let
us go back to the previous deﬁnition in the ﬁnite case. Notice that the proﬁle
ρ and the proﬁle ρ ◦ σ induce exactly the same distribution on preferences:
each preference in the image is chosen as many times under ρ as under ρ◦σ.
If we look at the literature on large economies (see Hildenbrand [13] and El-
lickson [10]), the justiﬁcation for the distributional approach is precisely the
fact that only the distribution of preferences and endowments should mat-
ter, not the identities of the individual agents. This expresses very accurately
our notion of anonymity, which generalizes the ﬁnite one and is based on the
distributions induced on preferences.
Given a coalition measure space (N,L,µ), every (measurable) preference
proﬁle ρ : N → R induces a (ﬁnitely additive) probability measure ν on the






= µ{i ∈ N : Ri ∈ E}, for every E ∈ E.
This induced measure is usually denoted in probability theory as ρ(µ). We
will use this notation. Now we are equipped to provide our deﬁnition of
anonymity, which requires that the aggregation rule depends only on the
distribution induced by the proﬁle on the set of preferences.
Deﬁnition 4 Given a measure space (N,L,µ), a preference aggregation rule
f is
(P5) µ-anonymous if ρ(µ) = ρ0(µ) implies f(ρ) = f(ρ0).
One implication of this deﬁnition is that sets of zero measure do not mat-
ter, since they do not alter the induced distribution on types. In particular,
a zero–measure coalition can never be decisive.
This anonymity notion is closely related to the notion of anonymity among
winning coalitions in simple games deﬁned in a somewhat diﬀerent setting
12by Banks, Duggan and Le Breton [7]. Note that the above requirement is
considerably stronger than asking for equal-treatment of proﬁles that diﬀer
over a measure zero of agents. Our equal-treatment notion, however, has
no “bite” unless the equal-measure coalition classes are suﬃciently large.
A particularly nasty example is the (1,β)-discounting measure space with
β < 1/2. In this space there are no two equal-measure coalitions. This and
similar examples can be avoided if the following richness condition on the
coalition measure space is satisﬁed:
Assumption (R1): For every ultraﬁlter U on the coalition algebra L there
is a coalition A ∈ U such that there exists a coalition B ∈ L \ U with
µ(A) = µ(B).
(R1) holds whenever there is a ﬁnite measurable partition of the set of
agents such that for every coalition in the partition there is another coalition
in the partition with the same measure. The reason is that, given any ultra-
ﬁlter, one (and only one) of the coalitions in the partition should belong to
the ultraﬁlter. In particular, (R1) would be necessarily satisﬁed if we repli-
cate an arbitrary society. As long as (R1) holds, replacing non-dictatorship
with µ-anonymity does result in an impossibility.
Theorem 1 Let assumption (UD) hold. There is no preference aggregation
rule satisfying (P1), (P2), (P4), and (P5) if and only if assumption (R1)
holds.
Proof: This proof is similar to the one Mihara [16] provides for a car-
dinality-based anonymity axiom. Suppose ﬁrst that there is a social choice
rule f satisfying (P1), (P2), (P4) and (P5). From (P1), (P2) and (P4), the
set of decisive coalitions is an ultraﬁlter U. (This result holds regardless of
whether the society is ﬁnite or inﬁnite; see e.g. Austen-Smith and Banks [6],
p. 47.)
If (R1) holds, there exist A ∈ U and B ∈ L \ U such that µ(A) =
µ(B). Suppose now that A ∩ B = ∅. Given any two alternatives x and y,
consider two preference relations R and R0 such that xPy and yP 0x and a
preference proﬁle ρ such that ρ−1(R) = A and ρ−1(R0) = Ac. Now deﬁne a
new preference proﬁle ρ0 by (ρ0)−1(R) = B and (ρ0)−1(R0) = Bc. Since the
induced distribution on preferences is the same, (P5) implies that f(ρ) =
f(ρ0). By independence of irrelevant alternatives (P2), B must be decisive
13for x against y, and since x and y are arbitrary, it follows that B is decisive,
contradicting our initial assumption that B / ∈ U.
Suppose now A ∩ B 6= ∅. Since U is an ultraﬁlter and B / ∈ U, we have
Bc ∈ U. Therefore A\B = A∩Bc ∈ U, while B\A = B∩Ac / ∈ U (otherwise
U would contain two sets with an empty intersection, A and B\A). We have
µ(A \ B) = µ(A) − µ(A ∩ B) = µ(B) − µ(A ∩ B) = µ(B \ A),
so the argument of the previous paragraph can be applied to A\B and B\A.
Now suppose that there is an ultraﬁlter U that violates assumption (R1).
Then the simple rule whose decisive coalitions are all members of U satisﬁes
all the desired properties. 2
It follows from this result that for any extension of the n−period measure
space with n ≥ 2 there is no aggregation rule satisfying (P1), (P2), (P4), and
(P5). More generally, there is no aggregation rule satisfying (P1), (P2), (P4),
and (P5) in every measure space in which there is a ﬁnite partition of the set
of agents in equal-measure coalitions.
4.2 Consensual Rules
Transitivity of preferences may be a rather strong requirement. We next
explore the possibility of relaxing it by requiring only the strict preference to
be transitive.
Deﬁnition 5 A preference aggregation rule f is
(P6) quasi-transitive if for every ρ ∈ RN
L and for all x,y,z ∈ X,
xPy & yPz ⇒ xPz.
For ﬁnite societies, Sen [20] showed the possibility of quasi-transitive,
weakly Paretian, independent of irrelevant alternatives, and anonymous pref-
erence aggregation rules. The example proposed by Sen is the strong Pareto
rule: an alternative is strictly preferred to another if and only if it is weakly
preferred by everyone and strictly preferred at least by someone. There are
other possibilities; from a characterization of quasi-transitive, weakly Pare-
tian, and independent rules by Gibbard (in an unpublished paper referred to
in [21]) it follows that in all possible rules that are also anonymous the only
14decisive coalition is the entire set of agents, and each agent has veto power.
Note that Sen’s example satisﬁes neutrality, a requirement that is stronger
than independence of irrelevant alternatives and that mixes the idea of inde-
pendence with that of equal-treatment of alternatives.
Let us introduce a new piece of notation. Given a preference relation R
and two alternatives x,y ∈ X, let us denote by I(R)(x,y) the indicator of
the preferences between the ordered pair (x,y): I(R)(x,y) equals 1 if xPy,
0 if xIy, and −1 if yPx. We deﬁne neutrality as follows:
Deﬁnition 6 A preference aggregation rule f is
(P7) neutral if, for all ρ,ρ0 ∈ RN
L and all x,y,a,b ∈ X,
[∀i ∈ N, I(ρi)(x,y) = I(ρ
0
i)(a,b)] ⇒ [I[f(ρ)](x,y) = I[f(ρ
0)](a,b)].
It turns out that, under another richness condition on the coalition mea-
sure space, we can obtain results for large societies that are an extension
of those that hold for ﬁnite societies. In particular, we can obtain a char-
acterization of the class of rules which give veto power to any coalition of
positive measure and, furthermore, take into account only how large is the
set of agents that strictly prefer one alternative over another. Formally, we
deﬁne the following class of rules:
Deﬁnition 7 Given a measure space (N,L,µ), a preference aggregation rule
f is consensual if, for every ordered pair of alternatives (x,y),
xPy ⇐⇒ ({i : xPiy},{i : yPix}) ∈ Vf
where Vf is a collection of ordered pairs of disjoint measurable coalitions
satisfying
(i) (N,∅) ∈ Vf,
(ii) If F ∩ A = ∅ and F 0 ∩ A0 = ∅, then
[µ(F) ≥ µ(F 0), µ(A) ≤ µ(A0) & (F 0,A0) ∈ Vf] ⇒ (F,A) ∈ Vf,
[µ(F) ≤ µ(F 0), µ(A) ≥ µ(A0) & (F 0,A0) / ∈ Vf] ⇒ (F,A) / ∈ Vf.
(iii) (F,A) ∈ Vf ⇒ µ(F) > 0 = µ(A).
15It is important to note that, in order for a consensual rule to be well
deﬁned, (UD) is a necessary assumption. It is a formal exercise to show that
the strict preference deﬁned as above is asymmetric and transitive, and that
the corresponding weak relation (xRy iﬀ [not yPx]) is reﬂexive and complete,
so f is a well deﬁned aggregation rule. Note, however, that the strict social
preference need not be negatively transitive, i.e. the weak social preference
need not be transitive. We also have that, since the rule only depends on the
distribution of preferences, it satisﬁes anonymity. Finally, the rule satisﬁes
neutrality because it is only based on the measures of agents that rank the
alternatives, not on any speciﬁc characteristic of the alternatives themselves.
An extreme example of a consensual rule is almost-sure unanimity, that
is, the rule deﬁned by (F,A) ∈ Vf if and only if F ∩ A = ∅, µ(F) = 1 and
µ(A) = 0. On the opposite extreme, we have an equivalent to the strong
Pareto rule deﬁned by Sen [20]: (F,A) ∈ Vf if and only if F ∩ A = ∅,
µ(F) > 0 and µ(A) = 0.
Our richness condition on the coalition measure space is the following:
Assumption (R2): For every pair of measurable sets B and C such that
µ(B) > µ(C), there is a measurable set D ⊂ B such that µ(D) = µ(C).
(R2) is satisﬁed if for each ﬁnite measurable partition of the agent space
there exists a ﬁner ﬁnite measurable equipartition. Note that neither (R1)
implies (R2) nor vice versa. For instance, the coﬁnite measure space satisﬁes
(R2) but not (R1). For an example that satisﬁes (R1) but not (R2), consider
the (2,β)-discounting measure space with β < 1/2. In this case, the simple
rule that has as decisive coalitions all coalitions that include both agents 3
and 4 satisﬁes (P1), (P2), (P5) and (P6), even though the coalition of agents
3 and 4 is not full measure.
Theorem 2 Let assumptions (UD) and (R2) hold. Then, a preference ag-
gregation rule satisﬁes (P1), (P5), (P6), and (P7), if and only if it is a
consensual rule.
Proof: As mentioned above, consensual rules satisfy (P1), (P5), (P6), and
(P7).
For the opposite implication, suppose that there is a social choice rule f
satisfying (P1), (P5), (P6) and (P7). Actually, only the weaker condition of
independence rather than neutrality is needed for the ﬁrst two steps of the
16proof. Using neutrality throughout the proof can indeed make it somewhat
shorter, but we choose to present a longer version for the sake of transparency.
From (P1) we know that N is decisive. Since µ(N) = 1, anonymity (P5)
implies that every full measure coalition is decisive. First, we claim that
there are no other decisive coalitions. Suppose this is not the case, i.e. there
is some decisive B such that µ(B) < 1. If µ(B) ≤ 1/2, by (R2) we can
ﬁnd a subset C of Bc such that µ(C) = µ(B). But then, using anonymity
(P5), we would have that C is decisive and disjoint with B, a contradiction. If
1/2 < µ(B) < 1, by (R2) we can ﬁnd a subset C of B such that µ(C) = µ(Bc).
Then, using anonymity (P5), the coalition Cc should be decisive. But then it
is easy to show that B∩Cc must be decisive. Consider any three alternatives
x,y,z and any proﬁle ρ such that xPiy for every i ∈ B and yPiz for every
i ∈ Cc. Then by quasi-transitivity xPz with xPiz for every i ∈ B ∩ Cc and
with preferences for other individuals unrestricted. From independence and
the fact that x and z are arbitrary, we get that B ∩ Cc is decisive. If the
original set B had measure µ(B) = 1−ε, with 0 < ε < 1/2, then we are left
with a decisive set B ∩ Cc = B \ C that has measure µ(B \ C) = 1 − 2ε.
Iterating the process, we obtain decisive sets that have a measure of 1 minus
a multiple of ε, so in a ﬁnite number of steps we get a decisive set of measure
smaller than 1/2, which leads to a contradiction by the argument above.
Second, we claim that for any pair of alternatives (x,y) and any proﬁle ρ
such that µ({i : xPiy}) > 0, we have xRy. That is, every positive measure
coalition has veto power. For suppose that there exists some measurable pro-
ﬁle ρ and a pair of alternatives x,y such that the coalition A = {i : xPiy} has
positive measure, but the aggregation rule has yPx. Consider an alternative
z diﬀerent from x and y and a proﬁle ρ0 such that zP 0
iy for every individual,
and preferences over x and y are as in ρ. Then by f weakly Paretian zP 0y and
by quasi-transitivity zP 0x. Note that, by independence, this holds for every
proﬁle in which every agent in Ac prefers z to x, regardless of the preferences
of agents in A with respect to x and z. From the usual argument behind
the proof of Arrow theorem (see e.g. [6], p. 35-36), employing weak Pareto,
quasi-transitivity, and independence, the coalition Ac is decisive. Since it is
less than full-measure, we get a contradiction by the argument in the previous
paragraph.
Now, let Vf be the set of pairs of coalitions (F,A) such that F = {i ∈
N : xPiy}, A = {i ∈ N : yPix}, and xPy for some proﬁle and some pair
of alternatives x,y. By neutrality, if (F,A) ∈ Vf, then given any pair of
alternatives w and z, for any proﬁle such that {i : wPiz} = F and {i :
17zPiw} = A, we must have wPz. From the previous paragraphs, we know that
(N,∅) ∈ Vf (part (i) of the deﬁnition of consensual rules), and if (F,A) ∈ Vf
then µ(A) = 0. Furthermore, asymmetry of the strict preference P implies
that µ(F) > 0 (part (iii) of the deﬁnition). It remains to show that part (ii)
of the deﬁnition holds.
Consider a disjoint pair (F,A) such that µ(F) ≥ µ(F 0), µ(A) = µ(A0) = 0
and (F 0,A0) ∈ Vf. If µ(F) = µ(F 0), by anonymity (P5) we get that (F,A) ∈
Vf. If µ(F) > µ(F 0), by (R2) F has a subset D of measure equal to µ(F 0).
We have two cases. Suppose ﬁrst that µ(F \ D) ≤ µ(D). By (R2), there
exists C ⊂ D such that µ(C) = µ(F \D). Now let D0 = F \C, then we have
that D ∪ D0 = F, and µ(D0) = µ(F \ C) = µ(F) − µ(C) = µ(D) = µ(F 0).
By anonymity (P5), (D,A) ∈ Vf and (D0,A) ∈ Vf. Consider a proﬁle ρ such
that:
i ∈ D \ D
0 ⇒ xPiyIiz,
i ∈ D
0 \ D ⇒ xIiyPiz,
i ∈ D ∩ D
0 ⇒ xPiyPiz,
i ∈ A ⇒ zPiyPix,
i / ∈ D ∪ D
0 ∪ A ⇒ xIiyIiz.
We have that xPy, yPz, and, by quasi-transitivity (P6), xPz. By construc-
tion, (F,A) ∈ Vf.
For the second case, if µ(F \ D) > µ(D), by (R2) we can ﬁnd a set
D0 ⊂ F \ D such that µ(D0) = µ(D) = µ(F 0). By (P5), (D,A) ∈ Vf and
(D0,A) ∈ Vf. By an argument similar to the one above, (D ∪ D0,A) ∈ Vf,
and by construction µ(D ∪ D0) = 2µ(F 0) < µ(F). Taking now (D ∪ D0,A)
as starting point instead of (F 0,A0), we repeat the same process until, in a
ﬁnite number of steps, we get a subset D00 of F such that (D00,A) ∈ Vf and
µ(F \ D00) ≤ µ(D00), which reduces to the ﬁrst case.
It remains to show that µ(F) ≤ µ(F 0), µ(A) ≥ µ(A0), F 0 ∩ A0 = ∅
and (F 0,A0) / ∈ Vf imply (F,A) / ∈ Vf. If, with the given assumptions, we
had (F,A) ∈ Vf, the argument in the previous paragraph would imply that
(F 0,A0) ∈ Vf, a contradiction. 2
In the standard ﬁnite-agent case, requiring that no single individual has
a veto leads back to an impossibility result. In large societies, however,
requiring that no individual has a veto is not inconsistent with consensual
rules as long as every individual (and thus, all ﬁnite coalitions) has measure
18zero. As discussed by Armstrong [2], assuming that individual agents have
measure zero ﬁts well with the standard notion of perfect competition.
4.3 Measuring Rules
We now drop transitivity requirements altogether, and tighten the remaining
axioms by imposing monotonicity.
Deﬁnition 8 A preference aggregation rule f is
(P8) monotonic if for all ρ,ρ0 ∈ RN
L and all x,y ∈ X,
[{i : xPiy} ⊂ {i : xP
0
iy}, {i : xRiy} ⊂ {i : xR
0
iy}, xPy ] ⇒ xP
0y.
For ﬁnite societies, it is known that a class of aggregation rules deﬁned
by (cardinality-based) anonymity, neutrality and monotonicity involves dis-
regarding all information other than the head-count of members agreeing
in their rankings. These are called counting rules (see e.g. Austen-Smith
and Banks [6]). For inﬁnite societies we can analogously deﬁne measuring
rules, which ignore all information other than how large the coalitions pre-
ferring one alternative over another are. Formally:
Deﬁnition 9 Given a measure space (N,L,µ), a preference aggregation rule
f is a measuring rule if, for every ordered pair of alternatives (x,y),
xPy ⇐⇒ ({i : xPiy},{i : yPix}) ∈ Wf
where Wf is a collection of ordered pairs of disjoint measurable coalitions
satisfying
(i) (N,∅) ∈ Wf,
(ii) If F ∩ A = ∅ and F 0 ∩ A0 = ∅, then
[µ(F) ≥ µ(F 0), µ(A) ≤ µ(A0) & (F 0,A0) ∈ Wf] ⇒ (F,A) ∈ Wf,
[µ(F) ≤ µ(F 0), µ(A) ≥ µ(A0) & (F 0,A0) / ∈ Wf] ⇒ (F,A) / ∈ Wf,
(iii) (F,A) ∈ Wf ⇒ µ(F) > µ(A).
19As in the case of consensual rules, we begin by noting that (UD) is a
necessary assumption for measuring rules to be well deﬁned. Note also that
consensual rules are just a special case of measuring rules with the added
requirement that (F,A) ∈ Wf implies µ(A) = 0. Condition (iii) in the def-
inition implies that the rule is asymmetric. Reﬂexivity and completeness of
the induced weak relation are immediate, so measuring rules are well deﬁned
aggregation rules. Measuring rules satisfy weak Pareto (P1) (because of prop-
erty (i) in the deﬁnition), anonymity (P5) (because the rule only depends
on the distribution of preferences), neutrality (P7) (because the rule only
depends on the alternatives being compared insofar as they determine the
measures of the sets of individuals that rank the two alternatives diﬀerently),
and monotonicity (P8) (because of property (ii) in the deﬁnition).
It is natural to ask whether µ−anonymity together with monotonicity
and neutrality characterize measuring rules. The answer to this depends on
the properties of the coalition measure space. When (R2) holds, the following
characterization is straightforward:
Theorem 3 Let assumptions (UD) and (R2) hold. Then, a measurable so-
cial choice rule satisﬁes (P1), (P5), (P7), and (P8), if and only if it is a
measuring rule.
Proof: As stated above, measuring rules satisfy (P1), (P5), (P7), and
(P8).
Now, suppose f is a weakly Paretian, µ-anonymous, monotonic and
neutral rule. Let Wf be the set of pairs of coalitions (F,A) such that
F = {i : xPiy}, A = {i : yPix}, and xPy for some measurable proﬁle
and some pair of alternatives x,y. By neutrality, if (F,A) ∈ Wf, then given
any pair of alternatives w and z, for any proﬁle such that {i : wPiz} = F and
{i : zPiw} = A, we must have wPz. From weak Paretianism we have that
(N,∅) ∈ Wf. This proves part (i) of the deﬁnition of measuring rules. For
part (ii), consider a disjoint pair of coalitions (F,A) such that µ(F) ≥ µ(F 0)
and µ(A) ≤ µ(A0) for some pair (F 0,A0) ∈ Wf. From (R2), there exists
a measurable subset C of F such that µ(C) = µ(F 0). If µ(A) = µ(A0),
then by anonymity we have that (F 0,A0) ∈ Wf implies (C,A) ∈ Wf. If
µ(A) < µ(A0), apply (R2) to get D0 ⊂ A0 such that µ(D0) = µ(A). We
have µ(Cc \ A) = µ[(F 0)c] − µ(A) ≥ µ(A0 \ D0). Apply again (R2) to get
D00 ⊂ Cc \ A such that µ(D00) = µ(A0 \ D0). If we now let D = A ∪ D00,
we have µ(D) = µ(A) + µ(D00) = µ(A0). By anonymity, we have also have
20in this case that (F 0,A0) ∈ Wf implies (C,D) ∈ Wf. By monotonicity, it
follows that (F,A) ∈ Wf.
It remains to show that µ(F) ≤ µ(F 0), µ(A) ≥ µ(A0), F 0 ∩ A0 = ∅
and (F 0,A0) / ∈ Wf imply (F,A) / ∈ Wf. If, with the given assumptions, we
had (F,A) ∈ Vf, the argument in the previous paragraph would imply that
(F 0,A0) ∈ Vf, a contradiction.
Part (iii) of the deﬁnition follows from the asymmetry of P. 2
We can ﬁnd examples where (R2) fails, and, nonetheless, only measuring
rules satisfy (P1), (P5), (P7) and (P8). One such example is a countable soci-
ety with a purely atomic measure such that µ({1}) = 1
2, µ({2}) = µ({3}) = 1
4
and µ({i}) = 0 for i ≥ 4. Examples like this are more of an anomaly, de-
pendent on having no more than two basic coalition sizes that “ﬁt” well
together.
If there are atoms of three or more distinct sizes, we can always ﬁnd non-
measuring rules that satisfy (P1), (P5), (P7) and (P8), as can be seen from
the following example also in a countable society. Let µ({1}) = 1
2,µ({2}) =
1
4,µ({3}) = µ({4}) = 1
8 and µ({i}) = 0 for i ≥ 5. Now consider the rule
where xPy if and only if xP1y and at least one of these is satisﬁed: (i)
xP2y, (ii) xR3y and xP4y, or (iii) xP3y and xR4y. This rule satisﬁes the
desirable properties, but it is non-measuring because the proﬁle xP1y, yP2x,
xP3y and xI4y leads to xPy, but the proﬁle xP 0
1y, yI0
2x, xP 0
3y and yP 0
4x leads
to xI0y. Note that in this example, as in the previous one, only consensual
rules satisfy (P1), (P5), (P6), and (P7). However, a small perturbation of the
agents’ weights would lead to non-consensual rules satisfying our properties.
5 Conclusions and Future Research
This paper considers the problem of social choice in a coalition measure space.
Rather than following the usual deﬁnition of anonymity as equal treatment
of coalitions of the same cardinality, we deﬁne anonymity (with respect to
the underlying measure) as the property that the aggregation rule depends
only on the distribution induced on preferences, and this implies equal treat-
ment of coalitions of the same measure size. Our analysis here subsumes
the ﬁnite case, and we have identiﬁed conditions under which the standard
results in the ﬁnite case can be extended to this more general setting. Our
conditions require roughly that the measure deﬁnes suﬃciently large classes
21of equal-size coalitions. One might pursue the task initiated here and extend
our results to parallel all of the results of the ﬁnite case (see, e.g. [6]), as
the characterization of q-rules or considering the consequences of requiring
acyclic aggregation rules. Our intention here is rather to convince social
scientists that the generalization formulated has the beneﬁts of including in-
teresting applications previously excluded from the standard models, and the
corresponding costs reduce basically to introducing the language of algebras
and measurability.
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